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PERSPECTIVES OF A NEW EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
WILLIAM H. HENNING*
In Professor Harrell's kind introduction,1 he indicated that I have
"succeeded" Professor Miller as Executive Director of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), and
the word he used is exactly right. I recently read David McCullough's
extraordinary book on John Adams, and he tells of the following
exchange during Thomas Jefferson's first visit as Ambassador to France
with the French Foreign Minister, the Comte de Vergennes:
"You replace Mr. Franklin, I hear," said Vergennes.
"I succeed," said Jefferson. "No one can replace him."2
I succeed Fred Miller as Executive Director. No one can replace
him.
It goes without saying that a national economy cannot function
efficiently without a core set of commercial laws to provide a stable
base. Can you imagine the added costs of doing business if common
transactions were governed by truly idiosyncratic laws in the various
states? We had just such a situation in secured-finance law before the
widespread adoption of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Creditors seeking to use personal property as security faced a
bewildering array of devices-pledge, chattel mortgage, conditional sale,
assignment of accounts receivable, trust receipt, equipment trust, factor's
lien, etc. Some of the devices were statutory in origin while others
sprang from the common law. Some nonpossessory devices required a
public filing as a means of avoiding problems stemming from a debtor's
ostensible ownership of collateral, others did not. The rules governing a
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particular device were often unclear, and the consequences of making a-
mistake, either in choosing or implementing a device, were draconian.
The system routinely imposed high transaction costs on lenders. These
costs were reduced dramatically by the nationwide success of a uniform
law-Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The need for uniformity does not mean that there is no room for
states to assert their individual interests in matters that do not go to the
core of a particular law. Federal legislation provides uniformity, but it
must of necessity be one-size-fits-all. The genius of the uniform law
process is that it creates general uniformity while providing the states
with an escape valve for the promotion of local interests. It is my view
that this process is essential to the functioning of our federalist system,
particularly at a time when Congress, largely through its use of the
commerce clause of the Constitution,3 has assumed extraordinarily broad
legislative authority.
I share the views expressed by Professor Miller regarding the
strength of the uniform laws process as compared with the process by
which legislation is developed at the federal level. However, the fact that
the Conference turns out a superior product, while important, does not
fully justify its existence as an organization. The greater justification, in
my mind, stems from the Conference's role as a bulwark of federalism.
As Professor Miller indicated, too much nonuniformity can turn our
strength into a weakness-in his words, the uniform laws process
"contains [within it] the seeds of its own demise."4  Too much
nonuniformity burdens the marketplace with unjustifiable transaction
costs, and this in turn increases the pressure for a federal solution. This
theme-that a strength can become a weakness-applies as well to the
process of modernizing the Uniform Commercial Code. The strength in
this instance is our historic success in enacting the original Code in all
fifty states (although we never could get Louisiana to adopt Article 2).
The weakness stems from the fact that, because the Conference has, with
the Code, achieved its goal of uniformity, it hesitates to promulgate a
Code revision unless there is a prospect of near-universal enactment. To
do so would create nonuniformity, and this runs counter to our
constitutional mission-"to promote uniformity in the law among the
several states on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and
3. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. Fred H. Miller, The Significance of the Uniform Law Process: Why Both Politics
and Uniform Laws Should Be Local: Perspectives of a Former Executive Director, 27
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 507, 516 (2002).
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practicable."' I have heard presidents of the Conference say many times
that we can afford to send out a free-standing act that is controversial, but
we cannot afford to do so with a revision of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
A recent example of such a free-standing act is the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA). UCITA, which has
probably generated more controversy than any act in Conference history,
was promulgated in 1999 and has since been adopted in only two
states-Maryland and Virginia. In 2001, the Conference initiated a
process to review UCITA, and that process has led to a series of
recommendations for change that will be debated at the 2002 Annual
Meeting.6 In the final analysis, the Conference may or may not succeed
in gaining widespread adoption of UC1TA, but even if the act itself is a
relative failure as measured by the number of enactments, it may
nevertheless promote uniformity by serving as a model for other
legislation or by being applied by analogy in the courts.
Promulgating a controversial revision of the Uniform Commercial
Code puts at risk more than the uniformity that has already been
achieved. There is today a sense among legislators that adoption of a
revision of the Code is inevitable. The best example of this is the recent
revision of Article 9, which was promulgated in 1998 and is today in
effect in all states. This aura of inevitability is important political capital
that the Conference will not spend lightly.
It is doubtful whether a project on the scale of the Uniform
Commercial Code could be successful in today's environment. In large
measure, this is a result of our own processes, which require that we
reach out to various constituencies that might be affected by a uniform
law, coupled with the remarkable ability of interest groups, using modem
methods of communication, to organize swiftly in order to bring pressure
to bear. These interest groups are often so at odds with one another that
they cannot reach a satisfactory compromise. It may also be that there is
less willingness to compromise today-to see the picture whole-than in
an earlier time.
Take for example the project to update Article 2 of the Code. That
project began with a strong recommendation from a study committee and
5. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 2001-
2002 REFERENCE BOOK, 92 (2001).
6. In July, 2002, after these remarks were made, the Conference finally approved
thirty-eight amendments to UCITA. See, William Henning, Fred Miller, and Michael
Kerr, UCITA revisited, 48 UCC Bulletin 1 (Nov. 2002).
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progressed over a decade ago to the drafting stage. Any number of
representatives of various industries attended meetings of the drafting
committee, as did representatives of consumer organizations. It should
come as no surprise to anyone that the interests of these groups do not
always converge.7 In general, the consumer representatives prefer a
regulatory approach to the law. In their view, the increased protection to
individual consumers provided by what they see as appropriate
regulation outweighs any resulting increase in transaction costs. Their
industry counterparts generally prefer a facilitative approach, one that
legitimates common business models without dictating behavior. In their
view, the increased efficiency derived from this approach lowers the cost
of goods, and the resulting benefit to consumers generally outweighs any
injustice that might befall a particular individual. Moreover, in their
view a greater level of regulation would not provide the protection
sought by the consumer representatives because it would not prevent bad
actors in the marketplace from continuing to take advantage of those
least able to protect themselves.
Let me use the debate over standard-form contracts as an example to
make this discussion concrete. From the perspective of the consumer
representatives, standard-form contracts are either evil in themselves or
provide a platform from which evil springs. Although the doctrine of
unconscionability has been around for quite a while, it is not, in their
view, sufficient to police the marketplace. They prefer that standard-
form contracts be subjected to an additional test; perhaps based on a
higher threshold for finding assent by the particular consumer, perhaps
based on the reasonable expectations of the average consumer. From the
standpoint of the industry representatives, standard-form contracts are a
critical part of the engine of mass-marketing. Far from being a source of
evil, they are a significant factor in making high-quality consumer goods
available to buyers at all income levels. The industry representatives
recognize that standard forms will occasionally go too far, but in their
view the doctrine of unconscionability provides buyers with sufficient
protection. Any new test would inevitably inject a higher level of
uncertainty into the enforcement of their contracts, and this would
inevitably raise costs.
Although I have focused on standard forms, the same arguments
played out over the effect of merger clauses, the efficacy of terms not
7. This is not to suggest that industry views on each issue are monolithic, but the
focus here is on the general approach of industry and consumer groups to laws that are
regulatory in nature.
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revealed until after payment, the ability of merchants to disclaim the
implied warranty of merchantability, and on and on. More recently, the
debate has centered around the extent to which the scope of Article 2
should encompass software that is contained in or otherwise associated
with goods. As I stand here today, the project to revise Article 2 is
between a rock and a hard place. If we do not adopt a scope provision
that is minimally acceptable to the high-tech sector of our economy, we
have been assured that Article 2 will face a concerted lobbying effort to
defeat it in the states. We face the same problem with the consumer
organizations if we fail to adopt a provision that is minimally satisfactory
to them. Thus far, we have been unable to thread the needle, although
efforts are continuing. 8 In the final analysis, we and our partners in all
Code projects-the American Law Institute-may face the excruciating
dilemma of whether to cease our efforts, thereby sacrificing over a
decade of hard work, or to send to the states a revision of the Code that is
unlikely to achieve near-universal adoption.
Regardless of the outcome, there are important lessons to be drawn
from our experience with Article 2. In my view, by far the most
important lesson is that we ought not take on a Code project unless there
is a strong need for reform such that there is a likelihood that interested
parties will have a powerful incentive to see the project succeed in the
states. In the case of revised Article 9, advances in technology and
changes in secured-financing techniques created a powerful incentive for
lenders to support a modernization effort and to compromise with other
interest groups, particularly those representing consumers. Put another
way, the Article 9 project succeeded in large part because there was a
strong wind in its sails. By contrast, the need for reforming Article 2 is
not nearly so strong.9 With the exception of the scope issue, industry and
consumer groups are generally satisfied that the draft does insufficient
harm to their interests to make it worth opposing, but as of today not a
8. In July, 2002, after these remarks were made, the Drafting Committee to Amend
UCC Article 2 proposed that the amendments not address the issue of scope directly but
that the definition of "goods" be amended to exclude "information." The proposal was
accepted by the Conference which then finally approved the amendments. In October,
2002, the ALl Council unanimously recommended final approval at the Institute's 2003
Annual Meeting. If that occurs, the drafting process will be over. Whether the
amendments will then face opposition in the states remains to be seen.
9. This is not to suggest that the study committee miscalculated when it
recommended the drafting project. At that time, Article 2 needed to be revised to
accommodate electronic contracting, a need that has since been satisfied by the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act and the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq. (2000).
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single interest group has been willing to affirmatively endorse its
enactment. There is no wind in Article 2's sails, but perhaps we can yet
avoid the storms of opposition and bring the project safely into port.
Stay tuned!
